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RECENT DECISIONS
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tions threatening to obstruct war production and the production and
distribution of essential civilian commodities. 3 These conditions created a public emergency which made action by the legislature imperative in order to protect the public safety, health, and general
welfare of the people of the State of New York.
The court's conclusion that the Act was within the police power
of the state also disposed of the plaintiff's contention that the statute
violated the due process clause.4

J. M.Z.
INCOME TAX-TAX STATUS OF TRUST INCOME DISTRIBUTED AS
PRizE.-Malcolm McDermott, the recipient of the Ross Essay Prize
awarded by the American Bar Association in 1939, petitioned the
United States Court of Appeals, Distrikt of Columbia, to review a
decision of the Tax Court, sustaining an income tax deficiency determined by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the income
from the award.
Ersldne M. Ross, a retired federal judge, left a will, one of the
clauses of which provided that the sum of $100,000 be given to the
American Bar Association to be safely invested by it, and the annual
income to be offered and awarded as a prize for the best discussion
of a subject to be suggested at the preceding annual meeting of the
Association. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, previous
to the award of the prize to the petitioner, construed this clause to
mean that in any given year the Association might spend less than
the entire income for that year; that it might in any given year expend more than the entire current and accumulated income; and that
it was empowered to pay the resulting deficiency, if any, from the
income of the following year.
In 1939 an award of $3,000 was made to Professor McDermott
for the best essay on the topic, "To What Extent Should the Decisions of Administrative Bodies Be Reviewable by the Courts." '
The Tax Court held that as Professor McDermott was the ascertained income beneficiary of the trust for 1939, the award was part
of his gross income and he was therefore taxable thereon. Held,
reversed. McDermott v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 150

F. (2d) 585 (App. D. C. 1945).
The question presented on appeal to the United States Court
of Appeals was whether such award was part of, the petitioner's gross
income within the meaning of Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code which includes "gains, profits and income ... from
professions

. . .

or

. .

. from any source whatever,"

3 N. Y. Laws 1945, c. 3, § 1.
4 U. S. CoNsT. AmEND. XIV, § 1; N. Y. CoNsT. Art. I, § 6.
125 A. B. A. J. 453.

and there-
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fore taxable; or whether it was a "gift" within the meaning of Section 22(b) (3) and therefore excludable from gross income.
The court pointed out that in accordance with the construction
of the Ross will by the Superior Court the trustees might make the
award out of past, present or anticipated future income and that the
record did not show whether the award to the petitioner was in fact
made out of the current income, accumulated income, or from other
funds. Therefore, as under the statute, only the current income of
a trust fund is taxable to the beneficiary, 2 the $3,000 award was not
part of the gross taxable income of the petitioner.
But even if it were shown that the award was made out of the
current income of the trust it would not follow that the award was
part of the petitioner's gross income for two reasons. First, under
the ruling in the Gavit and Beatty cases,3 relied upon by the respondent, only trust income which accrues to a beneficiary because it is
trust income is taxable to the beneficiary for the same reason. A
sum which is paid under the terms of a trust and which accrues
whether or not the trust has any income is not taxable to the recipient
merely 4because it is primarily payable and is in fact paid out of
income.
Second, the principle of the Gavit and Beatty cases, which dealt
with payments for long periods of time to beneficiaries named in the
original trusts, is not applicable to amounts payable only from income
by an educational or charitable trust to a beneficiary not named in
the trust instrument. The present award was not, as in the cases
cited above, a continuous flow of trust income through the trustee
as a conduit but rather a single gift, and such a gift is not income
to the donee merely because it is expressly made out of the income
of the trust.
The court considers at length the circumstances which require
the conclusion that the award was a gift and not income within the
meaning of the statute, 5 citing supporting cases,0 and points out that
the American Bar Association did not employ Professor McDermott;
that it neither expected nor received profit from the contest or from
the petitioner's participation in it; and finally that "requiring winners of scholarly awards to pay taxes on them would conflict with
the wise and settled policy of encouraging scholarly work."
M. H. L.

§ 162(b), (c).
aIrwin v. Gavit, 268 U. S. 161, 69 L. ed.
17 F. (2d) 743 (1927), aff'd 276 U. S. 598, 72
4Burnet v. Whitehouse, 283 U. S. 148, 75
5 INT. REv. CoDE §§ 22(a) (b) (3), 101(6),
2 INr. RFv. CODE

6

897 (1925); Heiner v. Beatty,
L. ed. 723 (1928).
L. ed. 916 (1931).
162(a).

Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U. S. 322, 87 L. ed. 785 (1943);

United States v. Merriam, 263 U. S. 179, 68 L. ed. 240 (1923).

